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Disqualification of the Former
Government Attorney and the
Affiliated Firm: Allegiance to Form
over Substance?
I. Introduction
During the past decade disqualification of opposing counsel for
violation of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility' has become an increasingly popular litigation tactic.2
Under DR 9-101(B) an attorney in private practice may be disquali-
fied from handling any "matter in which he had substantial responsi-
bility while he was a public employee." 3 Because the disciplinary
rule arises out of Canon 9, which states that "A Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety,"4 the tendency is to dis-
qualify the former government attorney solely for an "appearance of
impropriety," without requiring evidence of actual misconduct.-
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970). See, e.g., Canon 9, DR 9-
101(B), Canon 5, and DR 5-105(D) of the Code. The scope of this Comment encompasses
only disqualification of the former government attorney for violation of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. This must be distinguished from the restrictions placed on former gov-
ernment attorneys by criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 207(a), (b) (1976). Section 207(a)
prohibits a former federal official or employee from acting as an agent or attorney in connec-
tion with any matter in which he participated "personally and substantially" while in govern-
ment service. Section 207(b) forbids personal appearances for two years before any court,
department, or agency in connection with a matter over which the attorney had substantial
responsibility while in government service. The prohibitions of Section 207(a) and (b) do not
apply unless the Government is a party or has a direct and substantial interest in the proceed-
ing.
2. Because a motion to disqualify opposing counsel for violation of a disciplinary rule is
interlocutory in nature, it provides an immediate prophylactic remedy that the criminal sanc-
tions do not provide. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir.
1973). The Disciplinary Rules do not limit disqualification to matters in which the govern-
ment is a party, nor do they contain the one year time limit embodied in Section 207(b) of Title
18. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (attorney
disqualified under DR 9-101(B) despite a 15 year time lapse between signing the government
complaint and accepting private employment in a similar matter). See also Comment, Conflict
of Interests and the Former GovernmentAttorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977); 28 EMORY L.J. 215,
216, n.9 (1979). Cf. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 527 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir. 1976)
(countervailing policy considerations were weighed heavily and the attorney was not disquali-
fied).
3. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1970). DR 9-101(B)
provides as follows: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he
had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."
4. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1970).
5. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d at 649; Telos, Inc. v. Ha-
Recent controversy has arisen6, however, over the practice of
automatically disqualifying the affiliated law firm under DR 5-
105(D)7 when the former government attorney is disqualified.
Judges,8 the American Bar Association,9 and other authorities' ° rec-
ognize that strict adherence to the mandates of DR 9-101(B) and DR
5-105(D) may have a negative impact on the quality of government
attorneys far outweighing the purported benefit of maintaining an
appearance of propriety within the legal profession. The former
government attorney, having acquired expertise in a specific area,
may be viewed by potential employers as a liability to their firm,
rather than as an asset. Arguably, the most talented attorneys will
refuse government employment for fear of jeopardizing their ca-
reers. " The predicted result is a reduction in the quality of govern-
ment attorneys.
Although various tests and standards have been formulated to
resolve the disqualification dilemma, '2 application of these standards
has been inconsistent. Because courts ascribe different weight to the
waiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); Commonwealth v. Eastern Dawn Mobile
Home Park, Inc., - Pa. -, 405 A.2d 1232 (1979). But see Woods v. Covington County Bank,
537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Disqualfication of Counselfor the Appearance
of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 343 (1976).
6. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.) rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-
7042 (Dec. 12, 1979), in which the court granted a rehearing because of the controversy insti-
gated by the court's decision to disqualify a law firm. Over twenty-five amicus briefs have
been filed in this matter. See BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 25, 1980), at 144-48.
7. DR 5-105(D) provides that "[ilf a lawyer is required to decline employment or to
withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or continue such employment." In 1974 the
ABA amended DR 5-105(D) (1970). See note 87 infra.
8. See Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). In that case,
Judge Ainsworth stated as follows:
Canon 9 does not require the disqualification of every attorney who has been pri-
vately retained in a matter for which he had substantial responsibility while associ-
ated with the Government. . . . Such an inflexible application of Canon 9 would
frequently defeat important social interests including the client's right to counsel of
his choice, the lawyer's right freely to practice his profession, and the government's
need to attract skilled lawyers.
Id at 812 (citations omitted). In Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977), the
court discussed strict application of DR 5-105(D) as follows:
Should an attorney, having left Government [employment],. ineluctably infect all
the members of any firm he joined with all his own personal disqualifications, he
would take on the status of a Typhoid Mary, and be reduced to sole practice under
the most unfavorable conditions. . . . The iron rule ... would act as a strong deter-
rent to the acceptance of Government employment by the most promising class of
young lawyers.
Id. at 793. Accord, Commonwealth v. Eastern Dawn Mobile Home Park, Inc., - Pa. -, 405
A.2d 1232 (1979) (Roberts, J., opinion in support of reversal). See also International Elecs.
Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975).
9. E.g., ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OPIN-
ION 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 n.2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ABA FORMAL
OPINION 342. See generally ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, FOR-
MAL OPINION 26 (1930) (pertaining to Canon 36, which has been superceded by DR 9-101(B)).
10. E.g., Kauffman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Eth-
ics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1957).
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See notes 46-56 and accompanying text infra.
divergent policy considerations concerned, they reach inconsistent
results.' 3 While disqualification rests in the court's discretion,' 4 a
uniform approach to DR 9-101 (B) motions must be adopted in order
to promote predictability in the law.
This comment surveys the ABA provisions and recent case law
on disqualification of the former government attorney and the affili-
ated law firm. Judicial interpretation of the ABA provisions is ana-
lyzed in both situations, applicable rules are critiqued, and a
uniform approach is recommended.
II. Disqualifying the Former Government Attorney
Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) specifically defines the circum-
stances requiring disqualification of the former government attor-
ney."' Nevertheless, its ambiguous language makes consistent
application of the rule difficult.' 6 Accurate interpretation and con-
sistent application of the rule is possible only if the underlying policy
considerations are clearly understood and employed as guidelines. 7
A. ABA Provisions and Underlying Policy
The Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Canons,
Disciplinary Rules, and Ethical Considerations. 18 Only the Discipli-
nary Rules are mandatory in character. ' The Canons embody
"general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical
Considerations are derived, ' 20 and the Ethical Considerations pro-
vide principles upon which the attorney can rely when confronted
with an ethical dilemma.2 Although the appearance of impropriety
maxim embodied in Canon 9 is an important policy consideration
underlying DR 9-101(B), it is only one among several considerations
13. Id
14. In Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975), the court stated as follows:
The district court bears the responsibility for the supervision of the members of its
bar. Handelman Y. Weis, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); E F Hutton & Co.
v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 378 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The dispatch of this duty is discre-
tionary in nature and the finding of the District Court will be upset only upon a
showing that an abuse of discretion has taken place.
Id at 571.
15. See note 3 supra.
16. The ambiguous language that must be interpreted in order to make the necessary
determination of fact is what constitutes "private employment" in a "matter" in which the
attorney had "substantial responsibility" while he was a "public employee." ABA FORMAL
OPINION 342, supra note 9, at 5. Courts have encountered greater difficulty in determining
what constitutes "matter" and "substantial responsibility" than in interpreting "private em-
ployment" and "public employee."
17. See id





giving rise to the rule.22 Furthermore, no disciplinary rule mandates
disqualification solely for an appearance of impropriety. 23 In con-
trast, EC 9-3 implies that the mere appearance of impropriety result-
ing from a DR 9-101(B) violation warrants disqualification.24
Preventing an appearance of impropriety is not the sole purpose
justifying disqualification under DR 9-101(B). The rule also pro-
vides a prophylactic measure against actual wrongdoing.25 The
sanction imposed under DR 9-101(B) is intended to avoid the
"treachery of switching sides,"' 26 to safeguard confidential govern-
ment information from future use against the government, 27 and to
discourage public employees from abusing government power in or-
der to enhance their future employment opportunities in similar pri-
vate actions. 28 The first two policy considerations are also embodied
in Canons 4 and 5, while Canon 9 alone embodies the latter objec-
tive. The prohibition in Canon 4 against revelation or use of a cli-
ent's confidence or secret 29 parallels the DR 9-101(B) objective of
22. See notes 26-28 and accompanying text infra. Accord, Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). But see note 5 and accompanying text supra (cases in
which the court held that the "appearance of impropriety" is the overriding interest). See also
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc granted No. 79-7042 (Dec. 18,
1979) (entire firm disqualified for an appearance of impropriety). See generally McKay, An
Administrative Code of Ethics. Principles and Implementation, 47 A.B.A.J. 890, 893 (1961).
23. Similarly, Canon 9 and the "appearance of impropriety" maxim was not explicitly
delineated in the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. See generally 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1516, 1518 (1977).
The Kutak Commission recently unveiled the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Although the Commission emphasized that the draft does not consti-
tute ABA policy, it is nevertheless significant that the "appearance of impropriety" maxim is
deleted. Rule 1.11 of the draft, pertaining to the former government attorney, and the com-
ment to that rule imply that disqualification is premised on a conflict of interests and not on
the "appearance of impropriety." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ABA COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS Rule 1.11 (Discussion Draft 1980).
24. "After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not ac-
cept employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility
prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety
even if none exists." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-3 (1970).
25. This proposition is axiomatic. Although the implication of EC 9-3 is that disqualifi-
cation is required under DR 9-101(B) to avoid the appearance of impropriety, it is clear that
the avoidance of actual impropriety is of paramount concern to the moving party and disquali-
fication under DR 9-101(B) effects this objective promptly and completely. See note 2 supra.
26. See ABA FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9, at 3; Comment, supra note 2, at 1034.
See generaly E. F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); Allied Realty of St.
Paul v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 283 F. Supp. 464 (D. Minn. 1968), afl'd, 408 F.2d
1099 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 353-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Kauffman, supra note 10.
28. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 1034; Ass'N. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF
INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 233 (1960).
29. Canon 4 of the Code states, "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets
of a Client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1970). DR 4-101(B)
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly use a confidence or secret of his client to the disad-
vantage of the client, or for the advantage of himself or a third person, unless the client con-
sents after full disclosure. Id. DR 4-101(B) (1970).
"safeguarding . . . confidential government information."3 The
common-law attorney-client privilege is the essence of both con-
cerns. Canon 531 and its accompanying disciplinary rules proscribe
the "dual representation of clients with conflicting interests"32 and
"switching sides."33 Both of these practices constitute sufficient
grounds for disqualification of the former government attorney.
The conflict of interests and attorney-client privilege concerns
34
arise when an attorney leaves public employment and participates in
an action to which the government is a party.35 Disqualification of
the former government attorney under these circumstances is clearly
grounded in the protection of governmental interests.36 A less clear
mandate for disqualification occurs when the government is not a
party to the private action and the sole support for disqualification is
the appearance of impropriety standard of Canon 9 and DR 9-
101(B).37 No conflict of interests or "use of confidential government
information against the government" concerns arise in this situa-
tion.38  The only existing policy consideration is the possibility that
the former government attorney wielded his power in handling a cer-
tain matter with a view toward subsequent private employment in
the same matter. 39 Courts have held that disqualification is war-
30. See note 12 supra.
31. Canon 5 states, "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1970).
32. DR 5-105(B) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected
by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
ld DR 5-105(B).
33. The disciplinary rules falling under Canon 5 do not explicitly forbid "switching
sides," although such a prohibition may be inferred from DR 5-105(A) and (B). See ABA
FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9, at n.8; Comment, supra note 2.
34. See notes 26-28 supra
35. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979) (defense attorney dis-
qualified because of previous government employment during which he participated in crimi-
nal investigations and prosecutions; such investigations and prosecutions were so closely
related to defendant's case that the attorney was in a position to use privileged information
obtained in the course of his former employment in cross-examining important government
witnesses in the subsequent case). But see Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (although the government was the defendant and the former government attorney's firm
represented the plaintiff, the firm was permitted to continue representation despite the
"tainted" attorney's membership in the firm).
36. See United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Common-
wealth v. Easten Dawn Mobile Home Park, Inc., - Pa. -, 405 A.2d 1232 (1979).
37. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc granted,
No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.
1974); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); Commonwealth
v. Eastern Dawn Mobile Home Park, Inc., - Pa. -, 405 A.2d 1232 (1979).
38. Therefore Canons 4 and 5 are irrelevant and only Canon 9 pertains to this situation.
This may indicate a lack of substance behind the motion to disqualify.
39. A tangential consideration is the possibility that the attorney may have an unfair
advantage because he or she gained specific knowledge of the matter while working for the
government, such knowledge having been obtained only through superior "discovery" tools
available to the government. For discussions of these policy interests, see Woods v. Covington
ranted on this basis even if no evidence of actual misconduct is
presented,40 despite the substantial infringement on the opponent's
rights that results.4 ' This interpretation encourages use of DR 9-
101(B) for strategic purposes.42
B. The Ambiguous Language of DR 9-101(B).
Despite the underlying policy considerations, courts have en-
countered substantial difficulty in determining what constitutes a
"matter in which [the attorney] had substantial responsibility" 43
while employed by the government. The term clearly encompasses
the same lawsuit or litigation, but does not include cases with only
similar legal issues, procedures, or regulations.' Within the context
of DR 9-101(B), the same "matter" is any matter that is sufficiently
similar as to give rise to the previously mentioned policy concerns.45
The same matter, therefore, generally includes common parties, the
same or similar conduct, and a similarity of allegations.
46
Even that standard is not applied consistently, however. For ex-
ample, one court held that a government action and subsequent pri-
vate action were the same matter because the defendant was the
same, the allegations were the same, and the complaints were nearly
identical.47 A ten year time lapse between the two actions was found
County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501
F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
41. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text infra. Infringement of a client's right to com-
petent counsel of his choice is generally recognized as a countervailing policy concern. This
right is not absolute, however, and is therefore given less weight than the underlying policy
considerations.
42. The burden of proof is not heavy in these situations. All the movant need show is a
per se violation of DR 9-101(B). He is not required to show any evidence of actual wrongdo-
ing. The movant can achieve significant strategic advantages from disqualification. Some of
these advantages are delay, inconvenience to the opponent, expense, and denial of the attor-
ney's work product.
43. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1970).
44. ABA FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1038-39.
45. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974);
Emle Indus. Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). See also United States v.
Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 339, 340 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf. Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
46. ABA FORMAL OPINION 342 states that matter "seems to contemplate a discrete and
isolatable transaction or set of transactions between identifiable parties." ABA FORMAL OPIN-
ION 342, supra note 9, at 6. Such a definition gives rise to greater difficulty of interpretation
than the term "matter" itself. See also General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d
639 (2d Cir. 1974), wherein the court stated,
the district court set forth the proper tests (60 F.R.D. at 402):
In determining whether this case involves the same matter as the 1956 Bus case,
the most important consideration is not whether the two actions rely for their founda-
tion upon the same section of law, but whether the facts necessary to support the two
claims are sufficiently similar.
Id at 651 n.22.
47. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974). The court
in General Motors found the "City's antitrust action ... sufficiently similar to the 1956 Bus
case to be the same 'matter' under DR 9-101(B). Indeed, virtually every overt act of attempted
inconsequential in the determination of what constituted the same
matter.48 In contrast, disqualification was denied in a similar case
because of a fifteen year time lapse between actions.49 The court
reasoned that the defendant's industry had changed substantially
during that time period and that any knowledge of the prior action
would be of little value in the latter.5" Furthermore, the court deter-
mined that the passage of time would seriously erode the attorney's
knowledge of the government action.5'
The courts have also confronted definitional problems in con-
struing the term "substantial responsibility" as used in DR 9-101(B).
"Substantial responsibility" replaces the phrase "investigated or
passed upon" used in the predecessor to DR 9-101(B), Canon 36 of
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.52 The "substantial respon-
sibility" terminology rectifies the overly broad sweep of the Canon
36 language, which affected high ranking officials who merely "rub-
ber stamped" matters with which they had no personal contact.
5 3
Consistent with the objective of limiting the broad coverage of the
former rule, substantial responsibility in its present DR 9-101(B)
context means "personal and substantial involvement."54 This inter-
pretation limits disqualification because it restricts the meaning of
monopolization alleged in the City's complaint is lifted in haec verba from the Justice Depart-
ment complaint." Id at 650.
48. The court in General Motors noted that the passage of time is a factor to consider in
determining the applicability of Canon 9 but did not give if much weight due to the fact that
the Disciplinary Rules contain no explicit temporal limitation. Id at 650 n.21.
In cases in which no actual wrongdoing is detected by the court and the attorney is dis-
missed solely for an appearance of impropriety, the time element should be accorded greater
weight than it was given in General Motors. Certainly the "appearance of impropriety" will be
less likely to arise after a ten or fifteen year time lapse than after one year, especially if no
misconduct is shown.
49. Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 318 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1970).
Although the decision in Control Data was governed by Canon 36 of the former Code of
Professional Ethics, the provision of the Canon is identical to that of DR 9-101(B), see note 52
infra and therefore the interpretation of "matter" was guided by the same principles that un-
derlay DR 9-101(B).
50. Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 318 F. Supp. 145, 147-48 (D. Minn. 1970).
51. Id
52. Canon 36 provided "A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any
matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office of employ." ABA CA-
NONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 36. The phrase "substantial responsibility" is employed
in place of "investigated or passed upon" in order to alleviate difficulties in application of the
rule. See Comment, supra note 2.
53. [Flor example, it was held under Canon 36 that a lawyer could not accept em-
ployment in connection with a land title which he had passed upon in a perfunctory
manner, the title having been before him for consideration only because title reports
were made in his name as assistant chief title examiner or in the name of the chief
title examiner. And if disqualifying a lawyer because of a mere 'rubber stamp' ap-
proval of the work of another was not bad enough, this committee was confronted
with the necessity of either disregarding that language of Canon 36 or holding that a
lawyer who was a former governor was disqualified from litigation involving any
legislation he had passed upon-perhaps by vetoing, signing, or permitting to be-
come law without signature--as governor.
ABA FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9.
54. Id
personal involvement in the previous government matter to cases in
which the possibility of actual impropriety, rather than the mere ap-
pearance of impropriety, exists."
This limited interpretation of substantial responsibility conflicts
with the proposition that the appearance of impropriety is the con-
trolling element of DR 9-101(B). For example, an upper level public
official is more likely to be disqualified for an appearance of impro-
priety than is his subordinate, even if the former had no personal
involvement in the government action.56 Because the higher ranking
official is more visible than the subordinate, subsequent private em-
ployment in a related matter will appear improper to the public.
The subordinate, however, may have had substantial and personal
involvement in a government matter with little resultant appearance
of impropriety because of his lower public profile. If the "appear-
ance of impropriety" standard controls, the upper level official will
be more susceptible to disqualification. If, however, a showing of
"personal and substantial involvement" is required, a greater corre-
lation will exist between disqualification and a situation of actual
impropriety.
C. Emerging Judicial Interpretation
Professional canons of ethics are not designed for Holmes' 'bad
man' who wants to know just how many comers he may cut with-
out running into trouble with the law. They are drawn rather for
the 'good man,' or the ethical man, as buoys to assist him in chart-
ing his professional conduct. But the 'good man,' in his desire to
steer clear of any action which faintly borders on the g ethically
questionable, may by an excess of caution hinder the attainment
of other important social interests. When this occurs, it is essential
that these other policies be pointed out and that the standards be
clarified or, if necessary, altered to incorporate them.57
More than twenty years ago Judge Kauffman warned that the
situation of the former government attorney in private practice may
be conducive to an "overcautious approach" and that important pol-
icy concerns should be given consideration in order to temper the
harsh effects that result from strict application of the Canons.58
Within the past decade, however, the courts, arguably bound by the
Disciplinary Rules, have zealously adhered to an "overcautious ap-
proach."
Courts have strictly enforced DR 9-101(B) to disqualify a law-
yer because of his prior government employment in a related mat-
55. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 1041.
56. Id at 1041-42.
57. Kauffman, supra note 10, at 657.
58. Id See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
ter.59  The tendency to strictly enforce disqualification under DR 9-
101 (B) is apparently attributable to a strong desire to preserve public
perception of the integrity of the legal profession.6" The movants'
objectives in disqualifying opposing counsel, however, are more self-
serving. 6' The rapid growth in the size of law firms may have cre-
ated more conflict of interest situations. Nonetheless, a better expla-
nation for the increasing number of these motions62  is the
heightened awareness in the legal community that disqualification is
a useful litigation tactic.
In Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Telephone Co.63 and General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 64 although technical violations of DR 9-
101(B) may have occurred, it may be inferred that the moving par-
ties had no vested interest in disqualifying the attorney other than
obtaining a strategic advantage. 65 In each case the attorney in ques-
tion was previously employed in a government action substantially
similar to the subsequent private action,66 and had substantial re-
59. See, e.g., United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); General Motors Corp.
v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F.
Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); see also Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d
1099 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969) (disqualification under Canon 36, prede-
cessor of DR 9-101(B)); United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1964) (disqualifica-
tion under Canon 36). See generally Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979),
rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979) (entire firm disqualified).
Some jurisdictions give the Code of Professional Responsibility statutory weight, while
others view the Code as a persuasive indication of the standards to which the legal profession
must be held. See Note, Attorney's Conflict ofInterests Representation of Interests Adverse to
that ofFormer Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61, 65 n.23 (1973).
60. In General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974), the court
stated,
[W]ithout in the least even intimating that Reycraft himself was improperly in-
fluenced while in Government service, or that he is guilty of any actual impropriety
in agreeing to represent the City here, we must act with scrupulous care to avoid any
appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public and private segments of the
legal profession.
Id at 649. Accord, Commonwealth v. Eastern Dawn Mobile Home Park, Inc. - Pa. -, 405
A.2d 1232, 1235 (1979), wherein the court found no evidence of wrongdoing but noted, "At a
time when public confidence in the legal profession is seriously eroded ... McCoy must be
disqualified because of the appearance of impropriety." Id
61. In cases in which the government is not a party to the action and no evidence of
actual impropriety is presented, strong implications arise that the motion to disqualify is
brought as a litigation tactic. It is unlikely that the movant is only concerned with possible
public suspicion of the opponent's counsel. Instead, an inference may be drawn from these
situations that the petitioner's intent is to cause hardship to his opponent by depriving him of
the counsel of his choice, causing him to incur added expense by hiring new counsel, and
depriving him of the attorneys work-product. See generally, 32 VAND. L. REV. 819 (1979).
62. See Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1978). The circuit court in Central Milk determined that disqualification was not justified
because the petitioner waited more than two years before filing the motion to disqualify. Con-
tra, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042
(Dec. 12, 1979) (court held motion to disqualify was not barred by laches, although the motion
was filed two years after the action was commenced).
63. 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975).
64. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
65. The inference is drawn from the facts of the cases in conjunction with the reasons
stated in note 42 supra,
66. In Telos the court found that
sponsibility in the former suit.67 Thus, both cases illustrate a per se
violation of DR 9-101(B).68 The policy considerations supporting
disqualification, however, are less clear. Neither case gave rise to the
"treachery of switching sides,"6 9 nor presented any other apparent
conflict of interests.70 The possibility that confidential government
information could be used against the government was not present
because the government was not a party to the subsequent private
actions.7" The only underlying policy consideration present was the
possibility that the attorney had abused his government office to en-
hance his subsequent private employment in the same matter.
7 2
Both courts disqualified the attorneys solely for that reason and
opined that the ethical problem raised did "not stem from the breach
of confidentiality bred by a conflict of interests but from the possibil-
ity that a lawyer might wield government power with a view toward
subsequent private gain."73
The rationale behind disqualification for an appearance of im-
propriety resulting from the possibility of wielding government
power for subsequent personal gain is nebulous and should be given
little weight in light of countervailing policy interests.7 4 The feared
actual impropriety behind this "appearance" is that a government
Itihe present action parallels the earlier action. The plaintiff here is an in-
dependent interconnect company instead of the state of Hawaii, but the defendants
are the same in both actions and the relevant allegations of the earlier complaint are
repeated verbatim in the later complaint. Telos, Inc., seeks the same declaratory re-
lief, and treble damages on the same basis, as the State of Hawaii.
I find also that the State's action. . . and Telos, Inc.'s action here ielate to the
same matter, that is, the competitive practices of defendants with respect to the fur-
nishings of customer equipment.
Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D. Hawaii 1975).
Similarly, in General Motors the private action charged the same defendant with suffi-
ciently similar acts as were alleged in the government action. The court therefore found the
second action to be the same matter as the first action. General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
67. The disqualified attorney in General Motors admitted having had "substantial re-
sponsibility" in the former government matter. The attorney in Telos denied having had "sub-
stantial responsibility," but the court determined that such responsibility existed. The fact that
the attorney investigated the defendant for the same misconduct while in government employ-
ment and then filed the complaint supports a finding of substantial responsibility. Telos, Inc.
v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D. Hawaii 1975).
68. The four requirements listed in note 16 supra must be met in order to have a per se
violation of DR 9-101(B).
69. See notes 26 and 33 and accompanying text supra
70. See note 73 and accompanying text infra.
71. It is conceivable, however, that confidential government information might be made
public in the course of the private action. This issue was not addressed by the court, presuma-
bly because it was of no concern to the petitioner and would not have been a motive for filing
the motion.
72. This is the only policy consideration underlying DR 9-101(B) exclusively. When Ca-
non 4 and 5 violations do not occur, this speculative consideration provides a "catch-all" ra-
tionale for disqualification. See notes 29-33 and 37-42 and accompanying text supra
73. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650 (2d Cir. 1974); Telos,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. Hawaii 1975). See also ABA COMM.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FORMAL OPINION 37 (1931).
74. Disqualification for a slight possibility of misconduct is illogical when the result is
infringement of the opposing litigant's rights. The slight benefit derived from avoiding an
lawyer may use his position to create and develop a suit that he will
later bring Jn a private capacity.15 If actual impropriety is proved,
then disqualification acts as a punitive measure against the wrong-
doer and a general deterrent to all government employees who might
consider similarly abusing their power. When no evidence of actual
wrongdoing is offered, however, disqualification solely for this ap-
pearance of impropriety does nothing more than proclaim to the
public that the legal profession is virtuous.
76
Unfortunately, disqualification for this reason alone also warns
the prospective government lawyer that regardless of his ethical con-
duct or objectivity in handling government problems he will be
bared forever from handling similar matters in private practice.
The deterrent effect of these disqualifications may affect not only a
government attorney's conduct while in office but also his initial de-
cision whether to seek government employment."
The Woods v. Covington County Bank78 decision recognized the
importance of these countervailing policy considerations79 and em-
phasized that a court "should be conscious of its responsibility to
preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure ethical
conduct on the part of lawyers appearing before it and other social
interests, which include the litigants' right to freely chosen coun-
sel."" ° In balancing ethical conduct and other social interests, courts
should also consider that the expertise gained by government em-
ployment, to be utilized subsequently in private practice, should be
encouraged rather than discouraged, that the government's efforts to
recruit able lawyers are hindered by restrictive interpretation of the
appearance of impropriety does not justify the delay, expense, and harassment to the oppo-
nent. See Woods v. Covington County Bank wherein the court quoted the following:
It behooves this court,. . . while mindful of the existing Code, to examine afresh the
problems sought to be met by that Code, to weigh for itself what those problems are,
how real in the practical world they are in fact, and whether a mechanical and didac-
tic application of the Code to all situations automatically might not be productive of
more harm than good, by requiring the client and the judicial system to sacrifice
more than the value of the presumed benefits.
International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1293 (2d Cir. 1975),
quoting Brief for the Connecticut Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 7; see .P.
Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concur-
ring.)
537 F.2d 812-13 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. In General Motors the court asserted that the goal of DR 9-101(B) is to avoid the
possibility that a public official's action might be influenced by the hope of later being em-
ployed privately to uphold or upset what he had done. General Motors Corp. v. City of New
York, 501 F.2d at 649.
76. Although the "public's trust" may be the raison d'etre for Canon 9's appearance of
impropriety doctrine, see General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d at 649, public
opinion should not be given overriding weight in the balancing of interests.
77. The fear of a negative impact on the quality of government attorneys is perhaps the
most important social concern weighing against strict application of DR 9-101(B). See notes
8-11 supra.
78. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
79. Id at 810.
80. Id
Canons, and that the "sterilizing effect" of disqualifying the former
government attorney may hinder clients in obtaining proper coun-
sel.81
Accordingly, the Woods court delineated a two-prong test for
disqualification under Canon 9.82 Evidence must show "at least a
reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety
did in fact occur" and that "the likelihood of public suspicion or
obloquy outweighs the social interest which will be served by a law-
yer's continued participation in a case."' 83 Only upon satisfaction of
both facets of the test could an attorney be disqualified under Canon
9. Furthermore, the test effectively minimizes the problem of unwar-
ranted manipulation of Canon 9 for strategic advantage in order to
avoid impropriety that exists only in the minds of imaginative law-
yers.84
The Woods test effectively incorporates both an inquiry into ac-
tual impropriety and a balancing of underlying and countervailing
policy considerations. This comprehensive approach could be ap-
plied in a uniform manner by all courts.
III. Disqualifying the Affiliated Law Firm
A. Disqualication v. Screening-Controversy within the Organized
Bar
The practice of extending disqualification of an individual at-
torney to the affiliated law firm is rooted in the common-law. 85 Law
firm disqualification developed out of the concept of horizontal im-
putation of knowledge that is based on the recognition of the free
flow of information among the members of a firm. 86 Despite the
residual harsh effects of implementing firm disqualification, the ABA
amended DR 5-105(D) to mandate disqualification of an affiliated
firm whenever one of its members is disqualified under any discipli-
81. See Kauffman, supra note 10.
82. 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). The Woods court opined that
a lawyer need not yield "to every imagined charge of conflict of interests, regardless
of the merits, so long as there is a member of the public who believes it. . . . Surely
there can be some objective content to any inquiry into whether the 'appearance of
justice [or propriety]' has been compromised in a given case."
Id at 813.
83. Id at 813.
84. Id at 819.
85. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); Amer-
ican Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Telos,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F.
Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
86. For a thorough discussion of horizontal and vertical imputation of knowledge as it
applies to DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D), see Kauffman, supra note 10. See generally Com-
ment, Ethical Problemsfor the Law Firm of the Former Government Attorney." Firm or Indvid-
ual DisquaflocationZ 1977 DUKE L.J. 512; Comment, supra note 2.
nary rule.87
In view of the countervailing policy considerations and in an
attempt to mitigate the adverse impact of DR 5-105(D) upon the bar,
the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is-
sued Formal Opinion 342.88 Formal Opinion 342 suggests that firms
implement a "screening mechanism" to avoid disqualification. The
Opinion declares that if the firm bars the disqualified attorney from
any participation in, or financial benefit from, the matter in issue, it
can avoid firm disqualification.89
Although this alternative appeals to the bar, ABA Formal Opin-
ions are not law,9 ° and only one court has approved implementation
of screening as an alternative to firm disqualification.9 The major-
ity approach, however, follows a strict interpretation of the Discipli-
nary Rules. This approach is reflected by the District of Columbia
Bar Association's Inquiry 19.92 Inquiry 19 rejects the practice of
screening on the premise that avoidance of the appearance of impro-
priety is the main objective of DR 9-101(B), which can be enforced
only by a strict application of DR 5-105(D). 93
The recent controversy in the Second Circuit over the decision
to reject "screening" in Armstrong v. McA/pin9 4 illustrates the wide
87. See note 7 supra. Under the old rule, disqualification of the entire firm was required
only in cases in which an attorney was disqualified under the "conflict of interests" rule, DR 5-
105.
88. ABA FORMAL OPINION 342 articulates the policy considerations as follows:
Past government employment creates an unusual situation in which inflexible appli-
cation of DR 5-105(D) would actually thwart the policy considerations underlying
DR 9-101(B). The question of the application of DR 5-105(D) to the situation in
which a former government employee would be in violation of DR 9-101(B) should
be considered in the light of those policy considerations, vis: opportunities for gov-
ernment recruitment and the availability of skilled and trained lawyers for litigants
should not be unreasonably limited in order to prevent the appearance of switching
sides, yet confidential information should be safeguarded, and government lawyers
should be discouraged from handling particular assignments in such a way as to en-
courage their own future employment in regard to those particular matters after leav-
ing government service. The desire to avoid the appearance of evil, even though less
important, must be considered. A realistic construction of DR 5-105(D) should rec-
ognize and give effect to the divergent policy considerations when government em-
ployment is involved.
89. Id
90. The Formal Opinions are merely advisory in nature. The Ethics Committee of the
ABA issues the opinions as interpretation or analysis of a controversial ethical issue, to be used
by courts and attorneys as guidelines when confronting a similar dilemma.
91. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
92. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INQUIRY No. 19, DIST.
LAWYER 39-42 (1976).
93. Id Significantly, the entire Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar Associ-
ation did not approve Inquiry 19.
When the Inquiry came up for a final vote it received a majority of the votes cast, but
failed to receive final approval due to three abstentions which prevented obtaining
the votes of a majority of all Committee members as required by Committee rules for
decisions of such importance. Letter from Monroe H. Freedman to All Interested
People (Dec. 8, 1976).
Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney." Firm or Individual
Diqualocation, 1977 DUKE L.J. 512-13 n.4.
94. 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979).
divergence of opinion within the bar and the judiciary on the issue of
strict application of DR 5-105(D). The Armstrong decision aroused
sufficient dissension that the court granted a rehearing en banc and
accepted over twenty-five amicus briefs.9 5
B. Inherent Policy Concerns
The rationale underlying the practice of disqualifying all part-
ners when one is disqualified is particularly apparent in situations in
which the individual is disqualified because of either a conflict of
interests or proof that other actual misconduct is likely. The possi-
bility exists that the "tainted" attorney will transfer his information
to the law firm and thereby circumvent the DR 9-101(B) disqualifi-
cation.
9 6
Strict application of DR 5-105(D) in DR 9-101(B) cases has
been criticized in view of the unique policies pertaining to the situa-
tion of the government attorney.97 Because attorneys are frequently
disqualified under DR 9-101(B) for an appearance of impropriety
without evidence of actual impropriety, 98 extension of disqualifica-
tion to the firm is an unwarranted act99 with far-reaching conse-
quences. " Blanket disqualification of the firm may infringe on the
ability of the government to recruit qualified attorneys, impose strin-
gent restraints on the careers of government employees, and further
impair the client's ability to obtain competent counsel.' 0 ' Neverthe-
95. See note 6 supra.
96. This is the sole reason for the existence of DR 5-105(D).
97. ABA FORMAL OPINION 342 states that if DR 5-105(D) is applied strictly in all cases
of disqualification under a disciplinary rule then an entire governmental department could be
disqualified when one of its attorneys is disqualified. The Opinion provides in pertinent part
as follows:
The relationships among lawyers within a government agency are different from
those among partners and associates of a law firm. The salaried government em-
ployee does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representa-
tion that is inherent in private practice. This important difference in the adversary
posture of the government lawyer is recognized by Canon 7: the duty of the public
prosecutor to seek justice, not merely to convict, and the duty of all government law-
yers to seek just results rather than the result desired by a client. The channeling of
advocacy toward a just result as opposed to vindication of a particular claim lessens
the temptation to circumvent the disciplinary rules through the action of associates.
Accordingly, we construe DR 5-105(D) to be inapplicable to other government law-
yers associated with a particular government lawyer who is himself disqualified by
reason of DR 4-101, DR 5-105, DR 9-101(B), or similar disciplinary Rules. Although
vicarious disqualification of a government department is not necessary or wise, the
individual lawyer should be screened from any direct or indirect participation in the
matter, and discussion with his colleagues concerning the relevant transaction or set
of transactions is prohibited by those rules.
ABA FORMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9.
98. See note 5 supra
99. Disqualification is unwarranted in these situations because no threat is posed by the
disqualified attorney's membership in the firm if he has no information to transfer to his part-
ners that could be disadvantageous to the opponent or to the government.
100. The effects include the hampering of hiring competent attorneys by the government
and infringement of the client's rights.
101. Essentially the same policies that are implicit in DR 9-101(B) give rise to DR 5-
less, only one court has opted for screening rather than disqualifica-
tion of the entire firm.1
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C. Judicial Application of DR 5-105(D)
In Kesselhaut v. United States'013 the court refused to disqualify
an entire law firm after the firm had implemented screening meas-
ures as suggested in Formal Opinion 342.' 04 The court reasoned that
[a]n inexorable disqualification of an entire firm for the disqualifi-
cation of a single member or associate, is entirely too harsh and
should be mitigated by appropriate screening ... when truly un-
ethical conduct has not taken place and the matter is merely one
of the superficial appearance of evil, which a knowledge of the
facts will dissipate.'w
The court advocated an ad hoc approach in applying DR 5-105(D)
to DR 9-101(B) disqualifications, recognizing that in some instances
no screening procedure is adequate to counter the necessity for dis-
qualification of the entire firm. o6
Apparently, the distinction in determining whether to permit
"screening" or to disqualify the entire firm is the same distinction
drawn by the Woods court in determining when to disqualify an in-
dividual attorney under Canon 9. The determination is premised on
a finding of "the reasonable possibility that some specifically identi-
fiable impropriety did in fact occur" 107 and a balancing of the under-
lying and countervailing policy concerns.0 8 The Kesselhaut opinion
in accordance with Formal Opinion 342 suggests screening as op-
posed to firm disqualification if the individual attorney was disquali-
fied solely for an appearance of impropriety."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
adopted a different approach in Armstrong v. McAlpin. "o The court
admitted that no suggestion existed that the disqualified attorney
committed any impropriety whatever in his handling of the govern-
ment matter, nor that his joining the law firm after leaving govern-
ment service was motivated by any improper considerations."'
Nevertheless, the entire firm was disqualified because of an appear-
105(D). Similarly the same countervailing policy concerns must be weighed because DR 5-
105(D) intensifies the harsh results of disqualifying the individual attorney. See generally
notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra
102. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See also 12 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 189 (1978).
103. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
104. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
105. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d at 793.
106. Id at 793.
107. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra
108. Id
109. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
110. 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), rehearing en banc granted, No. 79-7042 (Dec. 12, 1979).
111. Id at 34.
ance of impropriety generated from one attorney's substantial re-
sponsibility in the former matter, from which the court perceived a
possibility or an opportunity for actual misuse of government
power.' 2 The Armstrong court, however, alluded to the possibility
of a different result in cases in which the former government lawyer
had "no realistic opportunity for enhancing the prospect of private
employment."" 1
3
Both the Kesselhaut and the Armstrong courts recognized that
DR 5-105(D) does not necessarily require firm disqualification in
every instance of individual disqualification, despite the rule's ex-
plicit directive." 4  The Kesselhaut tribunal advocated screening
rather than total disqualification when "truly unethical conduct has
not taken place.""' 5 The stricter Armstrong approach requires dis-
qualification of the entire firm whenever the former government at-
torney had an opportunity to abuse his government authority
because the opportunity elicits an appearance of impropriety." 6
Clearly, the Armstrong approach is the majority view' and com-
plies with the Code of Professional Responsibility."' The decision
in Kesselhaut, although aberrant, has seen increasing popularity and
could foreshadow a trend." 9
IV. Prospective Changes by the ABA
The ABA's Kutak Commission recently unveiled the Discussion
Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 20 Although the
Discussion Draft does not reflect ABA policy,' 2 ' it embodies signifi-
cant chances. The proposed Model Rules delete the appearance of
impropriety maxim presently embodied in Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. This omission could conceivably' 22 af-
112. The court reasoned that "lilt would not be realistic to expect that subtle efforts by a
government lawyer to shape investigations or lawsuits in the hope of later private reward could
be adequately detected and punished after the fact." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d at 34
n.5.
113. Id at 33.
114. The Kesselhaut approach is explicitly advanced, see notes 106-09 and accompanying
text supra, but the Armstrong court only implies that an exception to blanket disqualification
may exist under DR 5-105(D). Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d at 33.
115. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
116. 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text supra
118. The Code does not provide for screening but only for automatic disqualification
under the mandates of DR 5-105(D).
119. ABA policy will be determined by the new ABA MODEL RULES (which are not now
effective) and by the decision in the Armstrong case after the rehearing. See note 6 supra
120. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, (Discussion Draft 1980).
121. The text has not been adopted or approved by the House of Delegates, but remains
under study by the Commission and is open for further revision.
122. Although the omission of the "appearance of impropriety" maxim may affect judicial
interpretation, this is unlikely since the language of Rule 1. 11(a) provides for disqualification
without proof of misconduct.
fect judicial interpretation of proposed Rule 1.1 (a), which is similar
to DR 9-101(B).
Rule 1.11, titled Government Lawyer Conflict of Interests, pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a private client in connec-
tion with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee." The replacement of
the "substantial responsibility" language in DR 9-101(B) with "par-
ticipated personally and substantially" will rectify the current prob-
lem encountered when an upper level government official who is
responsible for matters handled by his subordinates is disqualified
for an appearance of impropriety without evidence of personal in-
volvement in or knowledge of the matter.1 23 The language of Rule
1.11(a) will limit disqualification to cases in which the opportunity
for actual impropriety exists. 1
24
Strict construction of Rule 1.1 (a), however, may lead to the
same result that now occurs under DR 9-101 (B) of disqualifying the
former government attorney for an appearance of impropriety. Al-
though that policy consideration is not addressed in the Model
Rules, it might be inferred from Rule 1.1 (a) because the rule does
not require any evidence of actual wrongdoing. If the principal re-
quirement of the rule is a showing of an opportunity for impropriety,
it may be used to disqualify an attorney because of a possibility of
misconduct that "exists only in the minds of imaginative lawyers."1 25
The proclivity to use the new rule for strategic purposes will con-
tinue if this unfortunate interpretation is drawn.' 26 Section (e) of
Rule 1.11 reaffirms the practice of extending disqualification of a
former government attorney to the affiliated firm. 127 Because the
rules do not acknowledge the screening procedure promulgated in
Formal Opinion 342, Rule 1.11(e), if it becomes effective, will bind
the courts to the well-established practice of firm disqualification.
The only element of Rule 1.11 that mitigates its stringent effect
is section (f), which provides for waiver of disqualification of the
government attorney by the appropriate government agency.
128
123. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra. In this isolated situation, the omission
of the appearance of impropriety doctrine, in conjunction with the term "participated person-
ally and substantially," will lead to a more just result.
124. This conclusion is premised on the requirement of Rule 1.11(a) that the attorney
must have "participated personally and substantially" in the government matter to warrant
disqualification.
125. This is the problem the court articulated in Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537
F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
126. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
127. Rule 1.11 (e) provides that "if a lawyer is required by this rule to decline representa-
tion on account of personal and substantial participation in a matter, except where the partici-
pation was as a judicial law clerk, no lawyer in a firm with the disqualified lawyer may accept
such employment." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 l(e) (Discus-
sion Draft 1980).
128. Section (f) of Rule 1.11 provides as follows: "The disqualifications stated in
Theoretically, this provision will safeguard the former government
attorney from unwarranted disqualification on the premise that the
government is the party whose interests are endangered when the
attorney leaves its employ and enters private practice. If waiver by
the government, the party in interest, is permitted, the effect will be
to further distinguish between meritorious motions and DR 9-101(B)
motions made only for strategic purposes.
IV. Conclusion
Disqualification of the former government attorney and the af-
filiated law firm is necessary in some instances to preserve the pub-
lic's trust in the integrity of the legal system and to protect the
petitioner from an opponent's misconduct. When no evidence of ac-
tual impropriety exists, strict application of DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-
105(D) should be discouraged because of the far-reaching and harsh
effects of blanket disqualification on the opponent and on society.
Because courts have used inconsistent approaches to DR 9-
101(B) motions, adoption of a uniform approach is necessary and
timely. The test implemented in Woods v. Covington County Bank' 29
should be employed uniformly; it embodies both an objective in-
quiry into the possibility of actual impropriety and a balancing of
the pertinent policy interests. The Woods test, therefore, will miti-
gate the harshness of disqualification solely for an appearance of im-
propriety and will separate the meritorious motion from the abuse of
DR 9-101(B) for strategic purposes. Furthermore, the approach uti-
lized in Woods will be consistent with Rule 1.11(a) of the Model
Rules if, and when, it becomes effective.
The screening procedure suggested by Formal Opinion 342 pro-
vides an alternative to automatic firm disqualification and should be
permitted in some situations despite the explicit directive of DR 5-
105(D). As noted in Formal Opinion 342, "Only allegiance to form
over substance would justify blanket application of DR 5-105(D) in




paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be waived by the appropriate government agency in accord-
ance with applicable law. The disqualification stated in paragraph (d) may be waived by the
consent of all parties to the adjudication." ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1. 11 (f) (Discussion Draft 1980).
129. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra
130. ABA FoRMAL OPINION 342, supra note 9.
